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Introduction
As part of a research program in the engineering of software for safety-critical sys-
tems, we are performing two case studies. The first case study, which is well underway, is
a safety-critical medical application. The second, which is just starting, is a digital control
system for a nuclear research reactor. Our goal is to use these case studies to permit us to
obtain a better understanding of the issues facing developers of safety-critical systems, and
to provide a vehicle for the assessment of research ideas.
The case studies are not based on the analysis of existing software development by
others. Instead, we are attempting to create software for new and novel systems in a process
that ultimately will involve all phases of the software lifecycle. In this abstract, we summa-
rize our results to date in a small part of this project, namely the determination and classi-
fication of policies related to software safety that must be enforced to ensure safe operation.
We hypothesize that this classification will permit a general approach to the implementation
of a policy enforcement mechanism.
The Problem
The functionality demanded by modern applications, including safety-critical
applications, frequently leads to software that is very large and complex. Functionality
requirements have increased because of the many benefits of computer-based control and
the availability of inexpensive yet powerful computing hardware. Hardware performance
limits that formerly restricted software complexity are rarely reached because of the
remarkable hardware performance now available.
Unfortunately, significant software defects tend to remain in such systems after
deployment despite extensive effort on the part of the developers [2,6]. Building these sys-
tems to perform as desired is very difficult for a number of reasons. Even the best software
development processes cannot ensure that faults are avoided completely during develop-
ment. Similarly, fault detection techniques are imperfect. Research has shown, for example,
that testing as an approach to verification cannot demonstrate sufficient levels of depend-
ability because of the sheer number of tests that are required [ 1].
Even building very small, simple software systems that achieve the extreme
dependability necessary for safety-critical applications has proven to be very challenging.
Formal techniques have made substantial progress and have been applied to real systems
in a number of cases, but their application to large, complex systems remains mostly
impractical. The complexity of large systems involving characteristics such as real-time
operation and distributed processing is likely to preclude any significant assurance that the
systems meet desired dependability goals if traditional techniques are used in traditional
ways.
A central question that arises is how to deal with a software system that is on the
one hand safety critical and on the other hand large and complex, i.e., so large and complex
as to preclude a complete attack on the problem of showing dependability using even the
best available techniques. We outline an approach to this problem that we are pursuing in
the next section.
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Technical Approach
An approach that has been tried in many safety-critical systems is to isolate the
problem of ensuring safe operation so that a small part of the software, often termed a ker-
nel, is responsible. This is the approach we are following but we are attempting to develop
a general, comprehensive approach to the problem by exploiting an analogy with security
kernels.
Security kernels are used to enforce access-control policies in classified information
systems. The idea of trying to exploit this technique to implement safety rather than secu-
rity, i.e., the concept of a more general safety kernel, was proposed by Rushby [5,7], among
others. The idea that Rushby suggested is different from other architectures described as
safety kernels because certain essential safety policies are enforced regardless of the
actions of the application software. This is in direct analogy with security kernels that
enforce access control with a similar degree of generality. Other safety-kernel architectures
that have been developed tend to provide a set of services that enforce required safety pol-
icies, if used appropriately by the application. This is a critical distinction.
The safety-kernel idea is of value if it is able to enforce a suitably large subset of
the required safety policies. A major benefit would be gained if this safety-kernel approach
could be implemented in a reusable manner, i.e., in such a way that the same safety kernel
implementation could be used in a variety of applications. To evaluate the safety-kernel
idea, assess its utility, and try to get some insight into generality that might be possible in
an implementation we have analyzed the two case studies at our disposal. We report our
results in the next section.
Empirical Results
We began this study by identifying the safety policies required by each application.
We then examined the two sets to ascertain whether general classes of policies existed and
whether the policies were similar in the two cases after application-dependent parameters
were removed. We begin this section by summarizing the important details of the two appli-
cations and list examples of the safety policies they require. We then discuss the resulting
structure of the policies and its implication on implementation and generality.
Magnetic Stereotaxis System
The first case study that we are engaged in is the Magnetic Stereotaxis System
(MSS). This is an investigational device for performing human neurosurgery being devel-
oped in a joint effort between the Department of Physics at the University of Virginia and
the Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Iowa [3,4]. The device operates by
manipulating a small permanent magnet (known as a "seed") within the brain using an
externally applied magnetic field. The patient is positioned at the center of six supercon-
ducting electromagnets. Under the direction of the computer, power supplies and current
controllers regulate the electric current in the electromagnets thereby producing the mag-
netic field that acts on the seed. Along each axis perpendicular to the patient's body, an X-
Ray source and camera produce fluoroscopic images for tracking the seed. By varying the
magnitude and gradient of the external field, the seed can be moved along a non-linear path
and positioned at a site requiring therapy, e.g., a tumor.
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When the MSS is in operation, there are a large number of events that could lead to
patient injury. The complete set is determined by a hazard analysis including the use of
techniques such as system fault-tree analysis. Events that could lead to patient injury
include failure of current controllers, X-Ray overdose, incorrect calculation of currents for
a seed movement, and failure to respond promptly to an increase in seed velocity. Each of
these could be the result of numerous different faults, and, in fact, the software could either
initiate or prevent many of these failures. Such failures can be prevented irrespective of
their cause and irrespective of the state of the equipment if safety policies such as the fol-
lowing (stated here informally) are enforced:
• If the seed moves faster than 2.0 mm/sec, the coil currents must be set to zero.
• If the vision system cannot locate the seed while it is being moved, the coil cur-
rents must be set to zero.
• The currents must be within 5.0 A of the value predicted by the coil control model.
• The current requested of a controller must be in the range -100 A to + 100 A.
• Before moving the seed, a reversal check must be executed to ensure that the
requested currents provide the desired direction within 5 degrees.
• An X-Ray device must be "off" for 0.2 sec before an "on" command is executed.
• The total X-Ray dose during an operation must be less than 100 millirem.
In the MSS system, a total of 42 safety policies have been identified. They are all
in complexity and breadth to these examples.similar
University of Virginia Reactor
The target of the second case study is the nuclear research reactor currently operated
by the University of Virginia. It is a 2 MW thermal, concrete-walled pool reactor. It was
originally constructed in 1959 as a 1 MW system, and it was upgraded to 2 MW in 1973.
Though only a research reactor rather than a power reactor, the issues raised are significant
and can be related easily to the problems faced by full-scale reactor systems.
The system operates using 20 to 25 plate-type fuel assemblies placed on a rectan-
gular grid plate. There are three scramable control rods, and one non-scramable regulating
rod that can be put in automatic mode. The primary process variables that are measured are:
I) Gross output, by movable fission chamber; 2) Neutron flux, by ion chamber; 3) Start-up
neutron flux and period, by BF 3 counter; 4) Core inlet and outlet temperatures, by thermo-
couples; 5) Primary system flow, by pressure gauge; 6) Control and regulating rod posi-
tions, by potentiometer; 7) Gross gamma-ray dose, by ion chamber; 8) Various limit set
switches to monitor pool level, etc.
As with the MSS, there are a large number of events that could lead to a reactor acci-
dent with the potential to cause extensive damage. Some examples of events that could
result in hazards include uncontrolled withdrawal of the reactor control rods, loss of water
in the reactor pool, failure of a coolant pump, and high radiation levels outside of the reactor
pool. Again as with the MSS, such failures can be prevented irrespective of their cause if
safety policies such as the following (again stated informally) are enforced:
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• The control rods must not be withdrawn at a rate faster than 1.5 mm/sec.
• When control parameters are adjusted, the state of the reactor must respond to
reflect the control settings.
• The position of the regulating rod must be adjusted at least once per second based
on the power output of the reactor.
If any of the following conditions is true, the control rods must be scrammed:
• A safety channel indicates a power greater than 125% of maximum power.
• The flow in the primary cooling system is below 3,400 liters/min (900 gals/min).
• The reactor inlet water temperature exceeds 105" E
• The pool level falls below 19 ft. 3 1/4 in.
• The radiation at the reactor face exceeds 2 mR/hr.
A preliminary identification of the safety policies in this application revealed a total
of 43 safety policies. As detailed requirements analysis proceeds, this number is likely to
rise.
Once the initial sets of safety policies had been identified for the two applications,
we focused on identifying common characteristics both within and between the two appli-
cations that might permit a logical organization of the two sets of safety policies. We were
seeking insight into what might be a general case in order to permit us to begin consider-
ation of a general, reusable, safety kernel. After examining a variety of possibilities, the
characteristic that permitted the most complete and systematic classification of the policies
was based on the origin and derivation of the safety policies.
Safety policies such as the examples above result from the system safety analysis,
and specify safety requirements that must be met by the various system components. In a
system safety analysis, a set of mishaps are identified along with hazards that could cause
the particular mishap. Each hazard is in turn placed at the root of a system fault tree and the
failure conditions that could result in the hazard are analyzed. The exact form of a fault tree
depends on the hazard being considered and the details of the particular application. How-
ever, we have identified a canonical fault-tree pattern for computer-controlled devices, and
we have been able to classify failure conditions according to their location and purpose
with respect to the canonical fault tree. We are thus able to classify safety policies according
to which type of condition the policy addresses, and this has yielded the following general
categories of policies:
System operation
Device failure
Software error
Software input
Sensor input
Operator error
Device operation
Device input from software
Failure response
Operator input to the software
Configuration or application data
Operator information
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Subsequent re-analysis of the two complete sets of safety policies from our two case
studies has shown that the various policies fit into the taxonomy very well. Thus, although
the applications are very different, their requirements for safe operation are remarkably
similar in basic form and differ to a large extent only in application-specific detail. Though
important, these details can be viewed as parameters that can be used to tailor a general
implementation strategy, i.e., a general-purpose safety kernel operating in a manner analo-
gous to a security kernel.
A safety kernel prototype is being developed that will enforce policies from the first
six categories of policies identified above. These are policies that originate near the top of
the canonical fault tree discussed above. They have been selected for enforcement because
they are most closely associated with the operation of the application devices. It is the
devices that actually cause a mishap, so it makes sense to enforce safety policies that are
directly related to devices. Policies from the other classes were omitted because the benefits
were not as great and the pragmatic issues of quality assurance, cost, and functional perfor-
mance would be adversely affected by enforcing policies from these classes.
Conclusions
Based on the two systems we have been studying, it appears to be the case that a
great deal of structure exists in the safety policies that have to be enforced. Given this sit-
uation, there seems to be a strong possibility that a reusable safety kernel operating inde-
pendently of the application in a manner analogous to the operation of a security kernel can
be built. Such a kernel would permit execution-time enforcement of selected safety policies
for systems too complex to verify by traditional means.
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THE PROBLEM WE FACE
Software Is Large And Complex In Many Safety-critical Systems:
Huge Subsystems, E.g. System Services, Windowing, The Application, Etc.
How Do We Build Safety-critical Software That Is:
- Dependable?
Cost-effective?
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Application
Software
Application Devices
Redundant
Hardware
• Keep It Simple, S*****
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Application Application Application
Windowing Windowing Windowing
System System System
Operating Operating Operating
System System System
Application Devices
Network
• Diverse Hardware, Network, High-performance Displays
• Extensive, Diverse And Unreliable Software, Perhaps Off-the-shelf
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SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND SAFETY POLICIES
Power Failure
Operator Error _
Sensor Failure _
Equipment Failure _
Data Error
Software Failure - - - _.
SOFTWARE
Correct Operation
• Safety Requirements Can Often Be Expressed As Safer), Policies
• Safety Policies -- Policies That "Software" Must Enforce To Avoid Hazard
Policies Such As The Following (From A Nuclear Reactor):
If the flow in the primary cooling system is below 3,400 liters/
minute, a scram must occur.
The source range must be indicating at least 2 counts second
before a safety rod can be withdrawn.
How Do We Ensure Enforcement Of Safety Policies?
_ uvASASACSW-nU.._, . s_ 5 (©J_ c v,_,g_,_a) Department of Computer Science
J
f
SECURITY KERNEL CONCEPT
• Concept Is That Security Kernel Controls Access To All Information
Kernel Enforces A Set Of Security Policies Irrespective Of Application
Software' s Actions:
_ Information
_ Classified
kl,N_'N_ Application./ NNN_N_ SECURITY Data
Software,,",,\\'q
• Might A Similar Approach Work For Safety (Rushby, 1989)?
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If SAFETY KERNEL CONCEPT
Concept Is That Safety Kernel Controls Access To All Devices
Kernel Enforces A Set Of Safety Policies Irrespective Of Application Software's
Actions:
Device Commands q
A Similar Approach Appears To Work For Safety
®
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SAFETY KERNEL
Application Software
System Software
Hardware
I I
Applicaoon
Safety Kernel
System Software
Hardware
Devices Devices
Policy Enforcement Given To Smallest, Simplest Kernel Possible
Kernel Controls Access To All Devices Thereby Controlling Effect Of Software
Policy Enforcement:
- Certain Important Policies Entirely Enforced By Kernel
- Enforcement Support For Other Policies
®
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"TRADITIONAL" KERNEL vs. SAFETY KERNEL
Safety Policy
Enforcement
Application
Software
I I
I Traditional I
_1 Kernel I
Support For I I
Policy , -,
Enforcement I
Hardware
Application
Software
Reduced
Safety
I Support
r- "i
I Safety I Safety Policy
I Kernel I Enforcement
I. .a
I Operating Sys.
[ Hardware
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f CASE STUDY - MAGNETIC STEREOTAXIS SYSTEM _'N
INTERFACES
X-Ray Source
I
, Radio Frequ. System
-
Cryogenic System
Magnetic System
X-Ray System
Operator Displays
Superconducting
Coil
X-Ray Camera
--[ Control System
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Patient Therapy Re,on
'_ M.R. Images, Patient Data, Etc.
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f SOME OF THE MSS SAFETY POLICIES
If the seed moves faster than 2.0 mm/sec., the coil currents must
be set to zero.
The coil currents must be within 5.0 amps of the predicted value.
The coil current requested by the application must be within the
range -100 amps to 100 amps.
An X-ray source must be "off" for 0.2 seconds before an "on"
command is executed.
The total X-ray dose during an operation must be less than 100
millirem.
Before moving the seed, a reversal check must be executed on the
requested currents to compare the predicted force with the
desired force.
And so on .....
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f CASE STUDY - UVA RESEARCH REACTOR
Cooling
Tower
I
L
Swimming
Pool
v
I
i
Control
Console
I
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f SOME OF THE REACTOR SAFETY POLICIES -'_
The control rods must not be withdrawn at a rate faster than 1.5
mm/sec.
The position of the regulating control rod must be adjusted at
least once per second based on the power of the reactor.
The control rods must be scrammed if a safety channel indicates
a power level greater than 125% of the authorized maximum.
The control rods must be scrammed if the pool water level fails
below 19' 3.25".
The control rods must be scrammed if the inlet water temperature
exceeds 1050 F
And so on .....
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Hazard
Analysis
SAFETY POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Fault Tree
Analysis
Failure Modes &
Effects Analysis
Specification
Other
Analysis
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_-_TAXONOMY - GENERAL SAFETY POLICIES
Case Study
One - MSS
Case StudyTwo - UVAR
General
Safety Policies
Policy
Taxonomy
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f EXAMPLE - DEVICE FAILURE DETECTION
Kernel Aware
Of Device Failure
Device Signals Environment
Failure Assertion Fails
No Command No "Heartbeat"
Response Received
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Captures Essential Content Of "All" Device Failure Detection Policies
Parameterized Implementation In Reusable Safety Kernel
Follows From Generalized System Fault Trees
®
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CONCLUSIONS
Systems Are Getting Very Complex:
- Simple Software Structures Unrealistic
- Users Need "Gee Whiz" Features
No Hope Of Verifying Everything Required:
Far Too Much Software
Off-the-shelf (Untrusted) Software Might Be Included
Safety Kernel Analogy With Security Kernel Seems Viable
Safety Policies Examined From Two Very Different Applications:
- Taxonomy Suggested By Similarity Of Policies
General System Fault Tree Patterns
General-purpose Safety Kernel For Variety Of Applications:
Seems Feasible
Significant Technical Issues In Implementation
Prototype Kernel Being Developed - Will Be Applied To Two Case Studies
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Session 6: Measurement
A Quantitative Comparison of Corrective and Perfective Maintenance
Joel Henry, East Tennessee State University
Does Software Design Complexity Affect Maintenance Effort?
Christopher Lott, University of Kaiserslautem
Profile of Software Engineering .Within NASA
Craig Sinclair, Science Applications International Corporation
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